| 博弈论视角下河流污染问题的研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 丁社教,柯小林.博弈论视角下河流污染问题的研究[J].未来与发展,2011(10):19-24. |
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| 作者姓名： | 丁社教 柯小林 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北工业大学人文与经法学院,陕西西安,710072 |
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| 基金项目： | 基于博弈论对西部地区地方政府制度创新的研究,西北工业大学人文社科和管理振兴基金(RW200716) |
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| 摘 要： | 通过河流公地悲剧和集体行动的逻辑视角切入,运用博弈论中的"囚徒困境"和"智猪博弈"的分析方法,对河流污染的成因进行分析,发现河流公地悲剧是博弈方之间缺乏监督与合作、博弈规则失灵、博弈目标及收益存在着缺陷等综合作用的结果,从而提出一些针对性较强的对策。
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| 关 键 词： | 公地悲剧 河流污染 囚徒困境 合作博弈 |
A Study of the River Pollution Based on the Game Theory |
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| DING She-Jiao,KE Xiao-Lin.A Study of the River Pollution Based on the Game Theory[J].Future and Development,2011(10):19-24. |
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| Authors: | DING She-Jiao KE Xiao-Lin |
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| Institution: | DING She-Jiao,KE Xiao-Lin(School of Humanities,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi'an Shaanxi 710072,China) |
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| Abstract: | Analyzing the causes of river pollution by using the Prisoner's Dilemma and Pigs Game through a perspective of tragedy of the commons and the logic of collective action,this paper show that the river pollution tragedy is a combined result of lack of supervision and corporation between the game player,failure of game rules and the defects of objectives and payments of the game,therefore,this paper proposes some effective solutions. |
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| Keywords: | tragedy of the commons river pollution prisoner's dilemma cooperative game |
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