基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链企业间信息安全决策分析

供应链中企业组织的信息安全不仅取决于企业自身对信息安全的投入,同时还要受到其它企业在信息安全方面的投入、共享及网络脆弱性等因素的制约。依据供应链上的企业关系的非对等性,运用Stackerlberg模型讨论了供应链中的核心企业和伙伴企业在信息安全方面的决策博弈,得出企业信息资产价值、网络脆弱性、共享成本、信息安全互补性等因素对决策结果的影响机制,并与Cournot模型博弈结果比较,最后通过算例对博弈结果进行了实例分析。

Analysis of Information Security Investment Decision between Supply Chain Enterprises Using Stackelberg Game

The information security of the enterprises in supply chain depends not only on the investment in information security by one specific enterprise,but also by other enterprises’ information security investment,sharing,network vulnerability and other factors.In addition,the supply chain has a non-reciprocal relationship.This paper divides enterprises in supply chain into two categories: core enterprises and partners respectively,then uses Stackerlberg game to analyze information security investment,decision-making sharing between the two different types of companies and the main factors such as enterprise information assets value,network vulnerability,sharing costs,complementary action in information security and so on.The mechanism of how those factors may influence the results is also explored.Then a comparison with the result from Cournot game is presented.Finally we validate game results through an example.