基于非对称信息下的商业银行竞争研究

将借贷模型与Hotelling模型相结合，可以分析信贷市场的两个重要特征对商业银行竞争行为的影响。一方面，信贷市场是信息不对称的市场，银企之间的信息不对称性不但对两者之间的策略性行为产生了重要影响，而且在银行之间也形成了信息不对称差异，从而使银行在进行战略选择时不得不考虑这一因素；另一方面，与非金融企业一样，信贷市场的消费者对商业银行提供的金融产品具有不同的消费者偏好，据此商业银行将采用不同的竞争策略。与非金融企业Hotelling模型均衡解不同，新模型的子博弈均衡表明，当银行对甄别能力的投资较少，并且对贷款申请人的资信状况持悲观态度时，银行将选择最大差异化策略。

A Study of Banking Competition Based on Asymmetric Information

Based on a combination of the lending model and the Hotelling model, this paper makes an analysis of the two essential features of a credit market that have effects on competitions between commercial banks. First, customers have their different preferences to a bank location. Secondly, the severity of asymmetric information between banks and customers makes banks face more uncertainty. To reduce this uncertainty, the bank uses credit-worthiness tests so as to get information about its customers . Meanwhile, to make sure the quality of a credit-worthiness test, the bank has to bear investments in information acquisition. The equilibrium outcome shows that the bank may choose a maximal differentiation stragegy if it is sufficiently pessimistic about the credit-worthiness of its customers and its a- bility of information acquisition is limited.