高耗水企业节水技术合作研发战略——水资源税规制下的博弈研究

制定水资源税政策和提高高耗水企业的节水技术水平是发展节水型工业、建设节水型社会的重要路径。政府水资源税政策如何影响高耗水企业之间的节水技术合作研发尚待深入探析。本文根据微分博弈理论，构建了水资源税背景下企业节水技术的非合作研发决策、两阶段研发共享激励型合作决策和完全协同研发决策，通过这些策略探讨了企业的均衡节水量和节水技术水平的时间演变轨迹，并对企业的均衡收益进行了对比分析。借助Rubinstein讨价还价模型来分配节水技术带来的收益，并针对水资源税试点区域的高耗水企业A进行了仿真分析与讨论。结果表明：在非合作策略下，企业的决策具有帕累托效率提升的空间；而研发激励策略能显著增强企业对节水技术研发的投入，提高节水技术的成熟度，并增加企业的收益；企业在节水技术研发的努力程度与其收益分配的比例呈正相关，合理的利益分配机制对于确保企业持续投入研发至关重要。此外，尽管受条件制约，水资源税仍然发挥了绿色税制的杠杆作用，刺激了高耗水企业技术研发的投入。研究结论揭示了水资源税对高耗水企业节水技术研发合作的驱动机制和关键因素，对水资源税背景下高耗水企业的可持续发展提供了有益启示。

Water-Saving Technology Development and Collaboration Strategies for High Water-Consuming Enterprises—Game Research Under Water Resource Tax Regulation

Implementing water resource tax policies and enhancing the level of water-saving technology in high water-consuming enterprises are crucial paths to developing water-saving industries and building a water-saving society. However， how government resource regulation policies affect the water-saving technology cooperation and R&D strategies among high water-consuming enterprises remains to be thoroughly explored. In light of this， it constructed non-cooperative R&D decision， two-stage R&D shared incentive cooperation decision， and fully collaborative R&D decision for enterprise water-saving technology under the background of water resource tax， based on differential game theory. Through these strategies， it explored the time evolution trajectory of enterprises’ equilibrium water-saving volume and technology level， and conductd a comparative analysis of enterprises’ equilibrium profits. Furthermore， it utilized the Rubinstein bargaining model to allocate the profits generated by water-saving technology and conducted a simulation analysis and discussion for high water-consuming enterprise A in the pilot area of water resource tax. The results show that under the non-cooperative strategy， there is room for Pareto efficiency improvement in enterprises’ decisions； while the R&D incentive strategy significantly enhance enterprises’ investment in the development of water-saving technology， improve the maturity of water-saving technology， and increase enterprise profits. The degree of effort in water-saving technology R&D is positively correlated with the proportion of profit distribution， and a reasonable profit distribution mechanism is crucial for ensuring continuous enterprise investment in R&D. Additionally， despite being subject to certain conditions， the water resource tax still plays the leverage effect of green taxation， stimulating investment in technology R&D by high water-consuming enterprises. The research findings reveal the driving mechanisms and key factors of water resource tax on the cooperative R&D of water-saving technology in high water-consuming enterprises， offering valuable insights for the sustainable development of high water-consuming enterprises under the background of water resource tax.