不完全信息条件下证券交易所经营与监管协调激励绩效研究

借助委托代理理论,在信息不完全的条件下,分析交易所协调激励专业管理层多任务努力的最优与次优激励问题。研究表明,当专业管理层执行监管任务的难度高于其执行经营任务的难度时,如果交易所要协调激励专业管理层在经营与监管任务上的努力,交易所需要付出比完全信息时更高的协调激励成本。

Research on Incentive Performances of Stock Exchange to Coordinate its Operation and Regulation under the Condition of Incomplete Information

This paper aims at researching on the internal factors of the too high cost of coordination between market operation and regulation in stock exchange in our country.Using the principal agent theory,this paper tends to make an analysis on optimal and suboptimal incentive when professional management are making multi task effort to coordinate and to promote under the condition of incomplete information.Research reveals the following fact.When it is more difficult for the professional management to enforce its supervision task than its management task and if stock exchange needs to make effort to coordinate professional management’s in management and supervisory task,stock exchange will pay more coordination incentive cost than the situation that the information is complete.