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选举行为背后:投机博弈--以武汉市C社区居委会直接选举为例
引用本文:陈伟东,姚亮.选举行为背后:投机博弈--以武汉市C社区居委会直接选举为例[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2005,44(3):61-66.
作者姓名:陈伟东  姚亮
作者单位:华中师范大学,城市社区建设研究中心,湖北,武汉,430079
基金项目:国家社会科学基金"中国城市社区居民自治的制度研究"(04BKS027)
摘    要:在当代中国,城市居民是“经济人”但不是现代公民,其目标是追求即时利益的最大化,精于成本与收益计算,决定是否参与选举以及如何参与,社区选举陷入投机博弈困境。在选举过程中,为达到“双过半”要求,地方政府和社区组织只能通过选择性激励机制(政治动员或物质激励)来化解这一困境,但选择性激励机制会因社会成本的增加而难以为继。培育现代公民社会,增强居民自组织能力,是走出投机博弈困境的有效途径。

关 键 词:社区选举  投机博弈  公民社会
文章编号:1000-2456(2005)03-0061-06
修稿时间:2004年10月24

Behind the Elective Behavior: Game of Speculation --Take Direct Election of C Community in Wuhan for Example
CHEN Wei-dong,Yao liang.Behind the Elective Behavior: Game of Speculation --Take Direct Election of C Community in Wuhan for Example[J].Journal of Central China Normal University(Humanities and Social Sciences),2005,44(3):61-66.
Authors:CHEN Wei-dong  Yao liang
Abstract:In contemporary China, the urbanites are "economic men" instead of modern citizens, their goals are to pursue the maximization of their instant interests.They are good at calculating costs and profits, then determine whether to participate and how to participate.It easily causes the community election into game of speculation.In the course of electing, in order to reach the aim of double over half, the local governments and community organizations can only dissolve this predicament through the incentive mechanism of the alternative (politics is mobilized or the material is encouraged), but the mechanism will be hard to carry on because of increase of the social cost. So it is the effective way to cultivate modern citizen society and strengthen resident ability of self-organizing.
Keywords:community election  game of speculation  civil society  
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