| 双头垄断市场中新技术研发投资的不完全信息博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张汉江,陈声益,李敏. 双头垄断市场中新技术研发投资的不完全信息博弈分析[J]. 研究与发展管理, 2008, 20(2): 86-90 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张汉江 陈声益 李敏 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖南大学,经济与贸易学院,长沙,410079;湖南省物流信息与仿真技术重点实验室,长沙,410079 |
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| 摘 要： | 产业内新技术的研究与开发是企业深层次竞争的重要手段．在新技术研发的结果表现为降低产品生产成本的假设基础上，将企业的研发投资分为两个阶段，各阶段以不完全信息的库诺特静态博弈为基础，建立了研究与开发的两阶段动态投资博弈模型．模型求解得到了企业研发投资成功率值、生产成本的降低值以及投资额之间的函数关系，发现了成功的研发投资将会推动企业下一期研发投资；通过算例仿真计算。得到了企业研发投资的无差异曲面．可供企业在新技术研究与开发投资时参考．
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| 关 键 词： | 研究与开发 不完全信息博弈 投资博弈 垄断竞争 无差异曲面 |
A Game Analysis with Incomplete Information for Enterprise R&D Investment in Duopoly Market |
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| ZHANG Han-jiang,CHEN Sheng-yi,LI Min. A Game Analysis with Incomplete Information for Enterprise R&D Investment in Duopoly Market[J]. R&d Management, 2008, 20(2): 86-90 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Han-jiang CHEN Sheng-yi LI Min |
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| Affiliation: | ZHANG Han-jiang1,2,CHEN Sheng-yi1,LI Min1,2(1.School of Economics , Trade,Hunan University,Changsha 410079,China,2.Hunan Provincial Laboratory of Logistics Information , Simulation Technology,China) |
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| Abstract: | The intra-industry R&D has already been an important competition means among enterprises.It consideres a particular situation that R&D can eventually lead to product cost reduction and enterprise's R&D investment be divided into two stages.It uses the incomplete information to make static gambling analysis for each stage and then derives the two stages Cournot dynamic game model about enterprise R&D investment.The study shows not only the function between success probabilities,product cost reduction and R&D... |
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| Keywords: | R&D game of incomplete information investment game monopoly competiton indifference surface |
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