Moral Education and its Near Relatives

Abstract

Two extreme positions on the relations between ME and RE are stated and examined. The distinctive aims and methods of each as developed in recent years indicate how they may be complementary. Moral reasoning is concerned with the assumptions and conditions of morality, and with situational realities as well as imperatives. Religious beliefs have the same place in decision‐making as moral principles. The difference between religious and social assumptions in ethics centres in interests and the conditions of their reconciliation or accommodation. Accountability ends in responsibility to oneself, and self‐judgement, which may not be identical with ‘conscience’. Accountability to God is not additional; and the setting aside of one's own will transforms the moral situation. The claim that religion is the basis of a more inward and highly motivated ethics is examined. Hemispheres of morality, public and private, are taken as an essential ethical division, which makes possible an accommodation between ME and RE, and avoids the educational dilemma set by Dr Jason Wright's contribution to the debate in JME Vol. 11 No. 1 (1981). Two changes in traditional attitudes are considered necessary, and as justified by the argument.