Incentives from curriculum tracking |
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| Institution: | 1. University of Chicago and NBER, United States;1. George Mason University and NBER, 4400 University Dr., Northeast Module I, MS 1J3, Fairfax, VA 22030, United States;2. Bentley University and NBER, 175 Forest St., AAC 195, Waltham, MA 02452, United States\n;1. Victoria University of Wellington and IZA, 15 Lambton Quay, Wellington, 6011, New Zealand;2. Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research and IZA, Level 5, 111 Barry street, Melbourne, 3010, Australia;3. University of Zurich and IZA, Schönberggasse 1, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland |
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| Abstract: | Curriculum tracking creates incentives in the years before its start, and we should therefore expect test scores to be higher during those years. I find robust evidence for incentive effects of tracking in the UK based on the UK comprehensive school reform. Results from the Swedish comprehensive school reform are inconclusive. Internationally, I find a large and widening test score gap between early and late tracking countries. Incentive effects of tracking show how early age scores can be endogenous with respect to later-age policies, and add to a growing literature on incentives in education. |
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