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金融支持与产业升级的最优契约结构
引用本文:齐讴歌,王满仓.金融支持与产业升级的最优契约结构[J].未来与发展,2014(6):69-74.
作者姓名:齐讴歌  王满仓
作者单位:[1]西安邮电大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710121 [2]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710069
基金项目:国家社会科学基金青年项目(批准号11CJL047);教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目(批准号13YJC790115);陕西省教育厅科学研究项目(批准号2013JK0141)
摘    要:本文基于Holmstrom 和Milgrom(1991)的多任务委托代理模型,解释了政府与商业银行在支持产业升级中的激励不相容问题。通过构建银行经营性业务与支持产业升级业务目标的激励机制模型,揭示商业银行最优激励契约均衡条件,刻画了在市场冲击情形下银行经营者经营行为偏离社会目标的发生机制,并从政府规制改善角度提出了金融支持产业升级的相关政策建议。

关 键 词:金融支持  产业升级  委托代理  最优契约

Research of the Supporting System of Finance in the Adjustment of Industry Structure
QI Ou-ge,WANG Man-cang.Research of the Supporting System of Finance in the Adjustment of Industry Structure[J].Future and Development,2014(6):69-74.
Authors:QI Ou-ge  WANG Man-cang
Institution:1. School of Economics and Management, Xian University of Posts and Telecommunications, Xi 'an Shaanxi 710061, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Northwest University, Xi 'an Shaanxi 710127, China)
Abstract:This paper studies the incentive-incompatibility problems that exist in the Adjustment of Industry Structure between government and commercial bank under a principle -agent framework. The paper establishes a multitask-multi-principal agent model based on Holmstrom and Milgrom ’s research to analyze the optimal incentive contract design on commercial bank .The analysis is followed by a model to show how market shocks may cause the behavior of commercial bank to be inconsistent to the goal of the government. Finally, the paper proposes some policy suggestion in order to improse the efficiency of the enforcement of the government goal.
Keywords:finance supporting  adjustment of industry structure  principle-agent optimal  incentive contract
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