盗版影响下厂商的反复制策略与政府监管政策

针对现实生活中存在的盗版产品与正版产品可能同质同价的问题,运用博弈论优化方法,建立了由正版厂商、盗版厂商和政府组成的信息产品市场的两阶段Stackelberg产量博弈模型,分析了正版厂商采取不同反复制策略时的市场均衡情况,以及社会福利最大化目标下政府的最优监管政策和正版厂商的策略选择。研究表明,正版厂商和政府在反盗版力量配置上存在此消彼长的博弈关系:当正版厂商采取强硬态度阻止盗版厂商的复制和进入时,政府将搭便车,放松或放弃监管;当正版厂商对盗版采取适度容忍态度时,政府将主动加强监管。作为正版厂商,采取主动的反复制策略总是有利的。政府应鼓励正版厂商积极提高反复制技术水平,并加强与企业的合作,共同打击盗版。

Manufacturer’s anti-replication strategies and government’s regulation policy under the influence of piracy

Aiming at the problem that pirate products may have the same quality and prices with the genuine products in real life, this paper uses the optimization method of the game theory to establish a two-stage Stackelberg output game model composed of the genuine manufacturer, the pirate manufacturer and the government in the information market, analyzes the market equilibriums when the genuine manufacturer adopts different anti-replication strategies, and studies the government's optimal supervision policy and the genuine manufacturer's strategy choice under the circumstances where the social welfare is maximized. The research indicates that the relationship between the genuine manufacturer and government's anti-piracy efforts is like a game, in which when the genuine manufacturer toughly prevents the pirate manufacturer from entering the market, the government will choose to free-ride or slacken the supervision, but when the genuine manufacturer chooses to tolerate the pirate action moderately, the government will actively strengthen the supervision. As a genuine manufacturer, it is always beneficial to take the anti-replication strategy. And the government should encourage genuine manufacturers to reinforce their anti-replication technology and strengthen their cooperation with the genuine manufacturer to fight against piracy.