| 基于企业不同发展状况的长期激励分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 魏云峰,张列平.基于企业不同发展状况的长期激励分析[J].预测,2001,20(4):49-52. |
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| 作者姓名： | 魏云峰 张列平 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学 系统工程研究所，上海 200030 |
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| 摘 要： | 长期激励是企业一种重要的激励手段，其主要形式是企业通过职务与等级的调整实现与员工之间的多阶段博弈，但在企业不同发展速度与发展前景下，长期激励效果与手段将会不同。本文基于多阶段博弈的模型。分析长期激励的激励作用，以及在企业不同发展速度与发展前景下的激励特征，探讨如何提高企业长期激励效率。
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| 关 键 词： | 激励 长期激励 多阶段博弈 企业 发展状况 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5192(2001)04-0049-04 |
Long Term Incentive Research Based on Different Development Status |
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| WEI Yun-feng,ZHANG Li-ping.Long Term Incentive Research Based on Different Development Status[J].Forecasting,2001,20(4):49-52. |
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| Authors: | WEI Yun-feng ZHANG Li-ping |
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| Abstract: | Long term incentive is an important incentive method.Po sition and level adjustment is major method of long term incentive. Long term in centive is based on multi-step game theory. The incentive method and result wil l be different when corporation is at different status. Based on different devel opment status of corporation, This paper analysis the benefit of long term incen tive and the main facts on long term incentive. |
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| Keywords: | incentive long term incentive multi-steps game |
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