| 信息市场不对称问题的多级委托/代理分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 谢亮,朱少强.信息市场不对称问题的多级委托/代理分析[J].图书情报知识,2006(1):70-73. |
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| 作者姓名： | 谢亮 朱少强 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 韩山师范学院图书馆,潮州,521041
2. 武汉大学信息管理学院,武汉,430072 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文运用博弈论与信息经济学中的委托/代理模型,分析了信息市场交易中的信息不对称问题,认为存在着与信息市场有关的多级委托/代理关系。与传统力图回避或减少代理人的观点不同,本文提出引入第三博弈方,建立与该市场交易有关的新的委托代理关系,是防止不对称信息条件下代理人败德行为的可行办法之一。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息市场 信息不对称 委托代理模型 博弈论 信息经济学 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-2797（2006）01-0070-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-04-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年4月7日 |
An Analysis of Multiple Commission-agency Relationship to the Asymmetry of Information Market |
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| Xie Liang,Zhu Shaoqiang.An Analysis of Multiple Commission-agency Relationship to the Asymmetry of Information Market[J].Document,Information & Knowledge,2006(1):70-73. |
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| Authors: | Xie Liang Zhu Shaoqiang |
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| Institution: | Xie Liang Zhu Shaoqiang |
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| Abstract: | With a commission-agency model of the game theory and intormation economics,the multiple commission-agency relationship related with the asymmetric information problem of information market is analyzed,and it is believed that there are multiple commission-agency relationships inthe market.Despite traditional view striving to reduce agencies,it is advised in this paper that potential immoral behaviors under the asymmetric information conditlon can be held up by the existence of a third party in the game,and by the introduction of anotlaer commission-agency relationship. |
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| Keywords: | Information market Asymmetric information Commission-agency model Game theory Information economics |
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