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休谟的同情观
引用本文:李丽丽.休谟的同情观[J].玉溪师范学院学报,2011,27(2):12-16.
作者姓名:李丽丽
作者单位:沈阳师范大学,辽宁,沈阳,110034
摘    要:休谟认为,德行之所以对他人和自己有用,令他人和自己快乐,是因为人们身上的人性原则或同情原则。由于人们感官知觉中都有快乐和痛苦,作为“明智的旁观者”时,人们会对好的行为或品质感到快乐,反之感到痛苦,继而作出赞成或者反对的表示。此时,其在道德判断上就能够与来自任何时代与地域的人达成一致,感官的苦乐也会经由情感的苦乐而升华为道德性的苦乐。

关 键 词:同情  想象  快乐  “明智的旁观者”

On Hume's View of Sympathy
LI Li-li.On Hume's View of Sympathy[J].Journal of Yuxi Teachers' College,2011,27(2):12-16.
Authors:LI Li-li
Institution:LI Li-li(Shenyang Normal University,Shenyang,Liaoning 110034)
Abstract:Hume believed the reason that virtue is profitable and pleasurable to oneself and others lies in the principle of humanity or sympathy.Because pleasure and pain are felt in the senses and perceptions,the judicious spectator will feel likewise and express approval or disapproval of behaviors involved.This is why concordance can be reached over time and space in moral judgment,when pains and joy arising in senses are uplifted toward the moral level through feelings.
Keywords:sympathy  imagination  pleasure  judicious spectator  
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