| 政府干预、管理层权力与国企高管薪酬-业绩敏感性 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 蔡地,万迪昉. 政府干预、管理层权力与国企高管薪酬-业绩敏感性[J]. 软科学, 2011, 25(9): 94-98 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 蔡地 万迪昉 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学管理学院,西安,710049 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(70972101) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 以2004～2006年间的国有上市公司数据为研究对象,分析了政府干预、管理层权力对国企高管薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现,地方政府干预降低了由当地国资委所控制国企的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性,但对当地由中央国资委所控制国有企业的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性没有显著影响;对地方国有企业而言,独立董事比例越高,其高管-薪酬业绩敏感性反而越低,没有发现两职合一对其高管-薪酬业绩敏感性有显著影响;对中央国有企业而言,独立董事比例和两职合一对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性都没有显著影响。
|
| 关 键 词： | 政府干预 管理层权力 薪酬-业绩敏感性 国有企业 |
Government Intervention, Managerial Power and Top Managers' Pay-performance Sensitivity of State-owned Firms |
| |
| CAI Di,WAN Di-fang. Government Intervention, Managerial Power and Top Managers' Pay-performance Sensitivity of State-owned Firms[J]. Soft Science, 2011, 25(9): 94-98 |
| |
| Authors: | CAI Di WAN Di-fang |
| |
| Affiliation: | CAI Di,WAN Di-fang(School of Management,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049) |
| |
| Abstract: | Using data of Chinese state-owned list firms during 2004 and 2006,this paper examines the impact of government intervention and managerial power on top managers' pay-performance sensitivity.The empirical results show that,government intervention weakens the top managers' pay-performance sensitivity in firms controlled by local SASAC but has no significant impact on firms controlled by central SASAC.For local state-owned firms,the higher the independent director ratio is,the lower the sensitivity is;CEO dual... |
| |
| Keywords: | government intervention managerial power pay-performance sensitivity state-owned firms |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
