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我国政府信息社会性失真机制分析
引用本文:张术松,汪雷.我国政府信息社会性失真机制分析[J].情报理论与实践,2008,31(6).
作者姓名:张术松  汪雷
作者单位:安徽财经大学,安徽,蚌埠233040
摘    要:政府官员有个人利益主体和公共利益代表双重身份,按照公共选择理论,人们愿意选择失真但符合个人利益的信息,政府官员也愿意选择失真但符合个人利益的政府信息。为此,政府官员可以采用个人造假、向外部转嫁和与公众博弈3种手段实现其目标。公众与政府双方博弈力量不均衡就无法实现纳什均衡,从而导致政府信息失真。

关 键 词:政府信息  信息失真  信息选择  博弈论  

Analysis of the Social Distortion Mechanism of the Government Information in China
Zhang Shusong et al.Analysis of the Social Distortion Mechanism of the Government Information in China[J].Information Studies:Theory & Application,2008,31(6).
Authors:Zhang Shusong
Abstract:Double identities are adopted by the governors as the chief body of interest as well as the representatives of interest.According to the theory of public options,people prefer to choose unreliable but self favorable information,which is with the same case of the governors.Therefore,the governors may adopt the three methods to realize their goal.That is fraud made by the individual,outside conveying and public gambling.The result of the power imbalance of the general public and the government may make it imp...
Keywords:government information  unreliable information  information option  game theory  
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