博弈视角下高校青年科研人员一稿多投行为研究

研究从经济学视角对高校青年科研人员一稿多投行为本质进行探讨，并从静态博弈与动态演化博弈角度对高校青年科研人员一稿多投行为的原因进行分析。研究发现:高校青年科研人员实施一稿多投行为的收益是影响其一稿多投行为的关键因素；高校青年科研人员实施一稿多投行为被查后的利益损失抑制一稿多投行为的产生。根据研究的结果，本文认为治理高校青年科研人员一稿多投行为需要改革高校青年科研人员考评制度，降低一稿多投行为的收益并扩大实施该行为的利益损失，在此基础上，实行期刊编辑部与高校共同参与的综合治理模式，以期达到事半功倍的效果。

Research on Multiple Submission Behavior of Young Scholars in Universities from the Perspective of Game Theory

This paper discussed the essence of multiple submission s of one draft by university researchers from the perspective of economics and analyzed the causes for this behavior from the perspective of static game and dynamic evolutionary game theories . It found that the profit is a key factor in university researchers’ multiple contribution behavior that can be restricted through enforcing the punishment to incur t he loss of interest of multiple submissions. The authors believe that young university researchers’ evaluation system can be reformed to reduce the benefits of multiple contribution s and expand its interest loss , along with a comprehensive governance model with the joint efforts of journal editorial departments and universities , to eventually eliminate the occurrence of multiple submissions.