Deciding for Others

In this paper, I offer Brighouse et al some friendly suggestions for expanding the notion of ‘educational goods’, pose some challenges for their book's decision-making framework and offer an opportunity for them to fill some small, but interesting lacunas. I start by comparing their typology of desirable educational outcomes with alternative classificatory schemes. I then suggest that certain processes and relationships might constitute ‘educational goods’. Building on the discussion of outcome-typologies, I ask Brighouse et al to indicate how knowledge contributes to flourishing and to comment on whether false belief might sometimes constitute an educational good. I then ask for a response to the view that their decision-making framework may seem objectionable to some by endorsing a particular conception of the good life. I pose four questions regarding for whom educational goods are good, the objectivity of the decision-making procedure, and possible lacunas regarding the issues of decision maker legitimacy and resolving disagreement. The paper concludes with an account of my own pedagogical uses of the book's most helpful framework.