| Abstract: | Recently, Chandler and Hala found that actively involving 3-year-olds in planning a deception facilitated performance on false-belief questions. The methodology used, however, provided no basis for determining whether the good performance of these young subjects was the result of the deceptive intent of their planning efforts, or whether other sorts of planning would have been equally effective. The research reported here systematically varied both ( a ) subjects' responsibility for planning where to relocate an object and ( b ) whether the goal behind this relocation was a deceptive one. The present research demonstrated, first, when subjects simply watched the transfer take place, it made no difference whether the object was moved for deceptive or some more practical reason. In contrast, those subjects who had themselves strategically planned a deception were markedly better at answering questions about another's false beliefs than those who simply witnessed the transfer taking place. No comparable facilitating effect was found when subjects planned a transfer but without deceptive intent. We argue that strategic planning works to underscore the importance of the belief states of others and provide opportunities not afforded by "standard" unexpected change or transfer tasks for showcasing 3-year-olds' emerging understanding of the possibility of false belief. |
