溢出率、减排研发合作行为和最优补贴政策

通过建立一个关于政府和双寡头的三阶段研发-补贴博弈模型,在征收排放税的条件下,分别对合作和不合作减排研发的政府研发补贴政策进行研究。研究发现:(1)在补贴条件下,合作研发情形下的社会福利比不合作情形下要高;产业的溢出率较小时,企业进行研发合作会比不合作获得更多利润,而在产业的溢出率较大时,则刚好相反;(2)在补贴条件下,当产业的溢出率较小时,企业选择合作研发行为;当溢出率较大时,企业选择不合作研发行为。针对不同的减排研发合作行为有不同的补贴政策。

Optimal subsidies for different abatement R&D organizations in duopoly with emissions tax

by the three-stage game model for the industry of duopoly with emission tax that is exogenous,we examine how the government makes optimal subsidy policy in consideration of duopoly' cooperative forms of abatement R&D.we find:(1) with subsidization,social welfare in R&D cooperation is always higher than that in non-cooperation;if the spillover of duopoly is less the profit in cooperation is higher than that in non-cooperation,if the spillover is larger the profit in cooperation is less;(2) with subsidization,if the spillover between duopoly is less the duopoly prefer to choose R&D cooperation,if the spillover is larger the duopoly prefer to choose R&D non-cooperation.Different optimal subsidy policies shall be applied for cooperative R&D behaviors in different forms.