创业投资信息不对称的博弈分析

由于信息不对称，投资直接进行创业资本投资，易产生逆向选择，导致创业资本市场低效率。发展创业投资基金，利用创业投资家的专业优势，降低创业资本投资过程中信息不对称程度，但产生了投资、创业投资家和创业企业家之间的双层委托代理问题。创业投资是投资、创业投资家和创业企业家三方的合作生产方式，创业资本投资过程是三方博弈过程，创业资本产出具有道格拉斯生产函数的特点，通过道格拉斯生产函数，对比分析三方静态和动态博弈，论证了单轮动态博弈过程中创业企业家最受益，创业投资家次之，投资是受损的观点。因此，在创业投资基金中，委托人应有控制权，并说明了有限合伙制创业投资基金利用三方多轮重复博弈，较好地解决了双层委托代理问题。

Analysing the Game of Information Asymmetry in Initial Investment

Due to information asymmetry,the investors directly operate initial capital investment is easy to bring about adverse option which leads to inefficiency of initial capital market.To develop initial capital fund will reduce information asymmetry during initial capital investment by using professional preponderance,but will engender double consigment agency among investors and initial investment expert and initial enterprisers.The author believes that initial investment is the mode of tripartite cooperative production among investors and initial investment expert and initial enterprisers;the process of inital capital investment is the process of tripartite game;and initial capital output is endowed with the characteristic of Douglas production function.By which to compare and to analyse tripartite static and dynamic game,the author demonstrates the viewpoint that initial investment expert is most benefited during single round dynamic game and initial enterprisers are the next and the investors are the losers.Therefore,the trustees should have the right of control in initial capital fund;and the initial investment fund under limited partnership system is fairly successful in solving the issue of double consigment agency by using tripartite multiple round repeated games.