委托—代理理论——中央银行独立性(CBI)的一种解说

在中央银行独立性问题上 ,长期以来一直存在着“相机抉择论”和“单一规则论”的争论。前者旨在执行逆风向行事的货币政策以烫平经济波动 ,从而主张中央银行应依附于政府而丧失其独立性 ;而后者则主张中央银行应遵循单一规则以稳定货币币值 ,抑制通货膨胀 ,为此 ,中央银行应排除来自各方面的干扰 ,保持其高度的独立性。委托——代理理论则通过中央银行与政府的最优合同的签定 ,使中央银行既能对产出和就业波动作出适当反映 ,又能避免相机抉择政策带来的通货膨胀偏好 ,因而成为中央银行制度设计的最优方案

Principal-Agent Theory:An Explanation of Central Bank Independence

In the problem of CBI,up to now,there has been a debate between discretion theory and rule theory,the former of which suggests that CB should carry out such monetary policies that can lower economic fluctuations,and the latter of which considers that CB must obey a single law in order to stabilize currency values and that CB should exclude or curtail the influence of government in order to be independent from it. Yet, principal agent theory proposes that by making an optimal contract between CB and government,CB can not only make optimal reflections to shocks of output and employment,but also avoid inflationary bias resulting from discretionary policy. So this theory is the best one among CB institutions.