| 基于委托-代理理论的政府R&D资源管理对策分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 周景泰. 基于委托-代理理论的政府R&D资源管理对策分析[J]. 研究与发展管理, 2003, 15(3): 13-16 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 周景泰 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 同济大学,经济与管理学院,上海,200092 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 从博弈论中委托-代理理论出发,分析了政府R&D资源分配和使用中的博弈关系,并以此为基础对政府R&D资源管理的策略进行探讨,提出了完善委托人约束机制、代理人激励机制和研究质量评价机制的若干观点。
|
| 关 键 词： | 科学技术管理 委托-代理 R&D资源 管理策略 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-8308(2003)03-0013-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002-11-11 |
Analysis of Management Tactics About R&D Resources from Government Based on Principal-Agent Theory |
| |
| ZHOU Jing-tai. Analysis of Management Tactics About R&D Resources from Government Based on Principal-Agent Theory[J]. R&d Management, 2003, 15(3): 13-16 |
| |
| Authors: | ZHOU Jing-tai |
| |
| Abstract: | According to principal-agent theory,it has analyzed the game relations during the course of distribution and usage of government R&D resources. Based on this it has discussed management tactics about R&D resources from government,and put forward some proposals for the improvement of principal-restrained,agent-promoted and research-evaluated mechanisms. |
| |
| Keywords: | S&T management principal-agent R&D resources management tactics |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《研究与发展管理》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《研究与发展管理》下载全文 |
|
