Grade inflation under the threat of students’ nuisance: Theory and evidence |
| |
Authors: | Wan-Ju Iris Franz |
| |
Institution: | Department of Economics, University of California–Irvine, 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697, United States |
| |
Abstract: | This study examines a channel, students’ nuisance, to explain grade inflation. “Students’ nuisance” is defined by “students’ pestering the professors for better grades.” This paper contains two parts: the game theoretic model and the empirical tests. The model shows that the potential threat of students’ nuisance can induce the professors to inflate grades. Ceteris paribus, a student is more likely to study little and to pester the professor for a better grade if: (1) the professor is lenient; (2) the studying cost is high; (3) the reward from pestering is high; (4) the cost of pestering is low. |
| |
Keywords: | D82 I20 I21 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|