Moral Law and Moral Education: Defending Kantian Autonomy

In this paper, I examine why Kantian ethics has had such a hard time of it. I look at readings of Kant's moral theory that have had great force in the 20th century and conclude that these have much to do with an ensuing confusion, which has led to charges of rigidity, formality and severity. Then I demonstrate that when we make moral judgements we rely heavily on the stock of rules, norms, duties and laws that is extant in our social life. We use these as frames that are already influential in the role and scope of our anticipated moral action. We deliberate primarily by forming a maxim (principle) that must have the consent of all. We do so only occasionally, as the existing stock of rules is already in operation, helping us to reject out-of-hand outlandish or egregious maxims. Finally, I discuss, in very cursory form, some educational approaches based on this way of conceiving Kantian moral theory.