| 考虑服务水平的两级供应链系统信号博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 姚树俊.考虑服务水平的两级供应链系统信号博弈研究[J].科技管理研究,2012,32(6):210-213. |
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| 作者姓名： | 姚树俊 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安财经学院管理学院,陕西西安,710100 |
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| 基金项目： | 陕西省自然科学基金资助项目(2009JM9008,2010TQ9006);陕西省重点学科建设专项资金资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对由供应商和制造商构成的两级供应链系统,在不完全信息条件下,建立以服务水平作为传递信号的供应链动态博弈模型,分析供应链信号博弈中分离均衡的实现过程及存在条件,最终给出分离均衡下供应链质量管理的有效对策。研究表明,制造商能够根据获取的服务质量信号,对供应商的潜在行为进行分析,选择最佳的应对策略,降低自身的运营风险,增强供应链合作的稳定性。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 不完全信息 信号博弈 分离均衡 服务水平 |
Research on Signal Game in two- echelon Supply Chain Based on Service Level |
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| YAO Shujun.Research on Signal Game in two- echelon Supply Chain Based on Service Level[J].Science and Technology Management Research,2012,32(6):210-213. |
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| Authors: | YAO Shujun |
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| Institution: | YAO Shujun(School of Management,Xi’ an University of Finance & Economics,Xi’ an 710100,China) |
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| Abstract: | Aiming at a two-echelon supply chain system of supplier and manufacturer,supply chain dynamic game model is established by service level as transferring signal.The process and conditions of separating equilibrium are deduced in the supply chain signaling game theory.Finally,effective countermeasures for supply chain quality management are given under separating equilibrium.This research shows that manufacturer is able to analyze the potential behavior of suppler according to service quality signal and take optimal countermeasures so as to reduce the risk and enhance the stability of supply chain coordination. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain incomplete information signaling game separating equilibrium service level |
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