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国家助学贷款市场与信息不对称
引用本文:曹夕多. 国家助学贷款市场与信息不对称[J]. 北京师范大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 0(1): 33-40
作者姓名:曹夕多
作者单位:北京师范大学,首都教育经济研究院,北京,100875
摘    要:在我国的国家助学贷款市场中,由于银行与学生、政府与高校在合约形成的前后信息不对称,导致出现了逆向选择和道德风险问题,具体表现为:高风险的借款者驱逐低风险的借款者,银行实行信贷配给;学生不当使用银行贷款;非贫困校在一定程度上驱逐贫困校;高校不积极落实国家助学贷款政策。现行的国家助学贷款制度在解决信息不对称方面,存在四点问题:加剧信息不对称产生的问题、制度缺位、制度不完善、制度实施效果受到其他相关制度的制约。

关 键 词:国家助学贷款市场  信息不对称  逆向选择  道德风险
文章编号:1002-0209(2006)01-0033-08
收稿时间:2005-03-10
修稿时间:2005-03-10

The Government-Subsidized Student Loan Market and Asymmetric Information
CAO Xi-duo. The Government-Subsidized Student Loan Market and Asymmetric Information[J]. Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Science Edition), 2006, 0(1): 33-40
Authors:CAO Xi-duo
Affiliation:Institute of The Capital Education Eeonomy, BNU, Beijing 100875, China
Abstract:In the current Government-Subsidized Student Loan (GSSL) market,the asymmetric information between the banks and students,and that occurring before and after the contract making between the Government and universities,has led to the problems of converse selection and moral risk.That is,higher-risk creditors expel the lower-risk ones,hence banks tend to fulfill credit rationing to the former;students do not make proper use of the loan;richer universities drive out poorer ones to some degree;and universities do not carry out the GSSL policies actively.Hence there are four problems in the solution: sharpening the problems caused by the asymmetry,policy missing,policy inadequacy,and policy implementation limitation from other relevant policies.
Keywords:GSSL market    information asymmetry   converse selection   moral risk
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