标准采纳过程中的相关方博弈分析与政策设计

分析在不同的市场结构下,不同属性的标准在被采纳过程中,企业与企业之间以及企业与政府之间的博弈行为,并通过相应的博弈模型试图找到不同状况下博弈的纳什均衡解,为标准被顺利采纳提供针对性政策参考。

The game behavior and policy design of the relevant parties during the adoption of the standard1

Standard from the development of enterprises to be widely adopted is a complex game and long timing verification process, and whether the standard can be adopted by the enterprise is essential intermediate link. Especially there are different behaviors under different market structures. This paper analyzes the game process between different enterprises in different market structures, between enterprises and enterprises, and between enterprises and governments. Through the corresponding game model, we try to find the Nash equilibrium of game under different conditions to get the policy implications and to provide supportive policy recommendations on adoption of the standard.