Chilling effects of patent trolls |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada;2. Smith School of Business, Queen''s University, Canada;3. Degroote School of Business, McMaster University, Canada;1. Brandeis University, United States of America;2. Pace University, United States of America;3. Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, New Zealand;4. Queensland University of Technology, Australia;1. National Scientific and Technical Research Council/Centro de Investigaciones para la Transformación (CENIT), National University of San Martin (UNSAM), Av. Presidente Roque Saenz Peña 832, Buenos Aires, Argentina;2. Science and Technology Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex, United Kingdom;3. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex, Library Rd, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RE, United Kingdom;1. Harvard University, United States of America;2. University of Massachusetts Amherst, United States of America;3. School of Economics, University of Bristol, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;4. University of Bath, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
| |
| Abstract: | We find that non-practicing entities (NPEs) exhibit a unique legal strategy of sequential rounds: (1) subject to the same patent, NPE plaintiffs file approximately seven follow-on lawsuits after the initial lawsuit; and (2) when a firm is sued by NPEs, the likelihood of its technology peers being sued increases by 14 % in the subsequent year. Defendants' technology peers experience significant market value losses around the lawsuit filing date. Moreover, defendants' technology peers respond to NPE litigation risk by increasing R&D investments to develop workaround technologies. However, the increase in R&D incrementally generates fewer patent citations or patents with lower values. Thus, our results highlight broader wealth effects and corresponding real effects of NPE-initiated litigation on defendants' technology peers. These results provide sharp contrasts to the insignificant wealth and real impacts on defendants' technology peers if litigations are initiated by practicing entities (PEs). The new evidence informs the current regulatory and policy debates pertaining to NPEs. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
