断定、否定、承诺、资格与不相容性(以及一些推论)

在这篇短文里,我将比较Huw Price([7])和我本人([9])关于否定的对称性处理的两种不同方式,并与Robert Brandom关于承诺、资格和不相容性的分析进行对比.这两种方式都可以归为Brandom所谓的规范语用学,是一种关于意义的语义学反实在论:语汇的含义是由人们的受规则支配(即规范的)的语用实践(语用学)予以明确的.这样的处理不同于直觉主义者的语义学反实在论,因为它提供了一种方式,使得我们可以区分"A"和"A得以保证"的推理意义.尽管"证明"具有某种中心地位,但"实证"并不是意义的首要承载者.而这种区分植根于对人们语用实践的细致分析.一方面,根据Price以及我本人的看法,人们既做断定也做否定:另一方面,Brandom则区分了自上而下的承诺与自下而上的资格,以及据此而定义的不相容性概念.本文考察这些不同进路之间的各种关联,并讨论从这些考察中浮现出的一种关于证明的看法.

Assertion, Denial, Commitment, Entitlement, and Incompatibility (And Some Consequence)

In this short paper, I compare and contrast the kind of symmetric treatment of negation favoured in different ways by Huw Price ([8]) and by me ([9]) with Robert Brandom's analysis of scorekeeping in terms of commitment, entitlement and incompatibility. Both kinds of account are what Brandom calls a normative pragmatics. They are both semantic anti-realist accounts of meaning in the significance of vocabulary is explained in terms of our rule-governed (normative) practice (pragmatics). These accounts differ from intuitionist semantic anti-realism by providing a way to distinguish the inferential significance of "A" and "A is warranted." Although proof plays a central role, in neither account is verification the primary bearer of meaning. Our accounts make these distinctions in terms of a subtle analysis of our practices. On the one hand according to Price and me, we assert as well as deny; on the other, Brandom distinguishes downstream commitments from upstream entitlements and the notion of incompatibility definable in terms of these. In this paper I will examine a number connections between these different approaches, and end with a discussion of the kind of account of proof that might emerge from these considerations.