| 一种基于效率工资下的监督模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李建新,何正斌. 一种基于效率工资下的监督模型研究[J]. 绥化学院学报, 2003, 23(2): 27-28 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李建新 何正斌 |
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| 作者单位： | 国防科学技术大学人文管理学院,湖南,长沙,410073 |
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| 摘 要： | 在效率工资制下存在一个激励效果以及为了评价员工工作努力程度而采用的监督力度问题，由此就产生了为监督而付出的成本。本文就最优监督力度以及成本问题讨论了在委托人(业主)和代理人(员工)都处在风险中性的情况下，业主应该采取的策略是：相机抉择以提高工资、增加惩罚或提高监督概率来加强监督。
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| 关 键 词： | 效率工资 监督模型 静态模型 监督成本 企业 员工 监督概率 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-8499(2003)02-0027-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002-10-02 |
A Supervision Model Based on Efficiency Wage System |
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| Li Jianxin He Zhengbin. A Supervision Model Based on Efficiency Wage System[J]. Journal of Suihua University, 2003, 23(2): 27-28 |
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| Authors: | Li Jianxin He Zhengbin |
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| Abstract: | In the efficiency wage system, the effect of inspiration and the degree of employees' hardworking need to be supervised. Therefore, the cost and strength of supervision should be evaluated. While taking into consideration of the problem of optimal supervision strength and cost, this paper discusses the strategy a proprietor should adapt under the context that this consigner (proprietor) and the agent (employee) are all in the situation of medium risk. The strategy should be: raise the wage at certain chance, strengthen the punishment, or enhance supervision by increasing the supervision probability? |
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| Keywords: | efficiency wage static model supervision cost optimal level |
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