| 农业集体化的效率:组织、博弈结构及激励——对林毅夫(1988,1990)两篇论文的评论 |
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| 引用本文： | 李祖繁. 农业集体化的效率:组织、博弈结构及激励——对林毅夫(1988,1990)两篇论文的评论[J]. 安徽师范大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2011, 39(2): 130-137 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李祖繁 |
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| 作者单位： | 安徽师范大学,经济管理学院,安徽芜湖,241003 |
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| 基金项目： | 安徽师范大学经济学特色专业建设资助项目，2010年中国经济学年会入选论文 |
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| 摘 要： | 集体化时期的农业生产低效率的原因是农产品价格和生产计划控制制度内存在激励不相容,偷懒实际上是农民对资源优化配置的理性反映。林毅夫关于退出权导致偷懒并引发了生产效率低下的结论是错误的。
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| 关 键 词： | 村社组织 工分制 博弈结构 激励相容 |
Efficiency of Agriculture Collectivization:Organization,Game Structure and Incentive |
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| LI Zu-fan. Efficiency of Agriculture Collectivization:Organization,Game Structure and Incentive[J]. Journal of Anhui Normal University(Humanities and Social Sciences), 2011, 39(2): 130-137 |
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| Authors: | LI Zu-fan |
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| Affiliation: | LI Zu-fan(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Normal University,Wuhu Anhui 241003,China) |
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| Abstract: | The reason of low efficiency in the period of collectivization is that agricultural product price and production plan control system lead to incompatibility of incentive Laziness is farmers' rational refection of resources optimization.Lin Yifu's conclusion that exit right results in low efficiency is wrong. |
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| Keywords: | organization of village and commune point system game structure incentive compatibility |
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