顾客随机选择模式下最终产品开发与模仿的博弈分析

在一个相互竞争的最终产品市场中,顾客往往是在一定品牌忠诚度下随机采用不同竞争品牌的产品,因此企业在制定率先开发还是等待模仿战略时,要充分考虑创新产品在竞争市场中的扩散形态,这使博弈分析变得更加复杂。本文在Bass创新扩散条件下,研究了改进更新产品率先开发或拷贝式模仿的利润和利润均衡点,进行了完全信息动态情况下两者之间的博弈分析。同时指出了在不完全信息动态情况下,研究企业率先开发或进行拷贝式模仿博弈的途径。

A Game Analysis of End Product Development and Imitation under the Model of Customer Random Choice

In the competitive market of end products, customers demonstrate a certain degree of loyalty; but more often than they do not choose from among the competing brands on a random basis.The consideration for innovative diffusion required of an enterprise in deciding whether to develop its own new products or to wait to imitate other enterprises' new products makes the game analysis more complicated.This paper records a research into the profit and the profit equilibrium in the light of the two strategies under the condition of Bass innovative diffusion and focuses on analyzing the dynamic game in the context of complete information.Moreover, the approach to the study of the game between product development and product imitation in the context of incomplete information has also been studied in this paper.