| 委托代理关系下的管理层激励效应探讨 |
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| 引用本文： | 尚玉芳. 委托代理关系下的管理层激励效应探讨[J]. 锦州师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版), 2011, 0(3): 60-63 |
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| 作者姓名： | 尚玉芳 |
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| 作者单位： | 渤海大学经法学院,辽宁锦州121013 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章在已有的关于上市公司激励理论研究的基础上,分析了我国上市公司激励的必要性。给出薪酬激励模型,并证明薪酬激励模式在我国是一种成熟的和应用广泛的激励办法,有助于企业价值的创造。在管理层持股分析的实证过程中发现我国上市公司管理层持股偏低,说明股权激励不是我国上市公司的首选,分析的结果可以为将要采用股权激励的上市公司提供重点参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 上市公司 委托代理 股权激励 管理层持股 代理成本 |
Exploration of Stimulation Effect to Agency-related Management |
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| SHANG Yu-fang. Exploration of Stimulation Effect to Agency-related Management[J]. Journal of Jinzhou Teachers College(Philosophy and Social Scienae Edition), 2011, 0(3): 60-63 |
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| Authors: | SHANG Yu-fang |
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| Affiliation: | SHANG Yu-fang(College of Economy and Law,Bohai University,Jinzhou 121013,China) |
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| Abstract: | On the basis of stimulation theories on listed companies,the necessity for stimulation is analyzed for China＇s listed companies.A pay-based stimulation model is proposed to prove that the model is effective in promoting the development of enterprises.It is concluded that the low level of share-holding in management cannot effectively stimulate the development of listed companies. |
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| Keywords: | listed company agency share-holding stimulation agency cost |
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