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二人常和博弈中的鞍点与纳什均衡的一致性
引用本文:冯素芬,张莉. 二人常和博弈中的鞍点与纳什均衡的一致性[J]. 北京工业职业技术学院学报, 2007, 6(1): 38-43
作者姓名:冯素芬  张莉
作者单位:北京工业职业技术学院,北京 100042;北京工业职业技术学院,北京 100042
摘    要:讨论了二人常和博弈中的占优策略、最优策略与稳妥策略的关系,比较最小最大原理和最大最小法分别选取的支付大小,通过例子说明稳妥策略组合不一定是纳什均衡;提出鞍点与纳什均衡的一致性,并证明了相应的定理.此外,类似地我们证明了鞍点的无差异性与可换性.

关 键 词:稳妥策略  最小最大原理  鞍点  纳什均衡
文章编号:1671-6558(2007)01-38-06
收稿时间:2006-11-23

Consistency of Saddle Point and Nash Equilibrium in Two-Person Constant-Sum Game
Feng Sufen,Zhang Li. Consistency of Saddle Point and Nash Equilibrium in Two-Person Constant-Sum Game[J]. Journal of beijing vocational & technical institute of industry, 2007, 6(1): 38-43
Authors:Feng Sufen  Zhang Li
Abstract:This paper will discuss the relationship of dominant, optimal and reliable strategy, compare the magnitude of payoffs selected respectively by minimax principle and maximin method in two- person constant - sum game, and explain that a profile of reliable strategies is not surely the Nash equilibrium through some examples. It will present consistency of saddle point with Nash equilibrium , and prove the corresponding theorems. In addition, we will prove similarlv the indifference and exchangeability about saddle points.
Keywords:reliable strategy   minimax principle   saddle point   Hash equilibrium
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