A Game Theoretic Approach to Peer Review of Grant Proposals |
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Authors: | Esra Eren Bayindir Mehmet Yigit Gurdal Ismail Saglam |
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Institution: | 1. Hamburg Center for Health Economics, University of Hamburg, Esplanade 36, 20354 Hamburg, Germany;2. Department of Economics, Bogazici University, Bebek, Istanbul 34342, Turkey;3. Department of Economics, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Sogutozu Cad. 43, Sogutozu, Ankara 06560, Turkey |
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Abstract: | This paper studies the grant peer review process employed by the Turkish regional development agencies, which is adapted from a review procedure of the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency of the European Union. To model this process, we consider a Bayesian strategic-form game played by three reviewers who observe both a common and a private score signal about an evaluated project and assign their scores to minimize the sum of their disutilities from the false acceptance and false rejection of the project. We numerically compute the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game and conduct several comparative statics exercises, after calibrating the model parameters accordingly. We also introduce two simpler review processes and compare their performances to that of the calibrated process in terms of outcome statistics, involving pass and fail rates of the evaluated projects, and manipulation statistics, involving the reviewers’ manipulation rate and size of scores. |
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Keywords: | Corresponding author Peer Review Grant Proposals Committees Bayesian Games |
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