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国家财政投入科研经费监督的博弈分析
引用本文:杨得前,严广乐,唐敏. 国家财政投入科研经费监督的博弈分析[J]. 科学学研究, 2005, 23(Z1): 63-67
作者姓名:杨得前  严广乐  唐敏
作者单位:1. 上海理工大学管理学院,上海,200093
2. 中国热带农业科学院农业机械研究所,广东,湛江,524091
摘    要:本文建立了一个科研基金部门与科研人员之间的博弈模型,并讨论了科研人员滥用科研经费的可能性、科研基金部门审计的概率与有关因素之间的关系。在上述分析的基础上,作者提出了反科研经费滥用的对策与建议。一是要加强对科研人员的职业道德教育。二是提高基金部门的审计人员的职业素养,同时加大对违规使用科研经费的科研人员的处罚力度。

关 键 词:基金部门  科研人员  博弈  对策
文章编号:1003-2053(2005)07-0063-05
修稿时间:2005-04-30

An analysis of game on supervision of scientific fund government invests
YANG De-qian,YAN Guang-le,TANG Min. An analysis of game on supervision of scientific fund government invests[J]. Studies in Science of Science, 2005, 23(Z1): 63-67
Authors:YANG De-qian  YAN Guang-le  TANG Min
Abstract:A game model between departments of scientific fund and scientific researchers was established in the paper.The author analyzes connection between probability of abuse of scientific fund,probability of audit and related factors.On the basis of forgoing analysis,some proposals and countermeasures for anti-abuse of scientific fund were put forward.Firstly,we should strengthen education of professional ethics.Secondly,professional quality of auditors in departments of scientific fund should be improved and more severe penalty for scientific researchers who abuse scientific fund should be implemented.
Keywords:departments of scientific fund  scientific researchers  game  countermeasure
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