农村资金互助合作机制及其绩效阐释

中国合作金融组织在剩余控制权制度安排设计的过程中受到了合作社思潮和股份制思潮两种思潮的驱动。前者强调成员主导和民主决策，后者注重风险责任和风控能力。然而，这两种思潮及其相关的民主、集权和分权三种设计思路均未能实现成员间能力、权利、风险及收益的匹配。反思、澄清合作金融组织剩余控制权制度设计中的合作社元素和股份制元素，构建一个“制度规则—制度过程—制度目标”的分析框架，并在该框架下结合具体案例，对分别代表民主思路、集权思路和分权思路的剩余控制权民主决策模式、发起人控制型模式和分权型模式进行分析与比较，有助于解决合作金融组织剩余控制权制度安排中的难题。展望未来，重构合作金融组织的剩余控制权制度安排应将其理解为一个特殊的金融中介，围绕大小股东利益冲突这一核心矛盾，按照风险匹配与能力匹配两个原则配置剩余控制权，以期实现组织成员间能力、权利、风险及收益的匹配。

Risk and risk management in management accounting and control

China's cooperative financial organizations are driven by two thoughts of co-operative thought and joint-stock thought in the process of designing residual control system arrangement. The former emphasizes member-led and democratic decision-making, while the latter emphasizes risk responsibility and risk control ability. However, these two thoughts and their related democratic, centralized and decentralized design ideas fail to achieve the matching of capabilities, rights, risks and benefits among members.This paper reflects on and clarifies the cooperative elements and shareholding elements in the design of residual control rights system of cooperative financial organizations, and constructs an analytical framework of