基于人力资本不确定性的风险投资契约设计

信息不对称是契约理论的核心概念,是交易契约设计的最基本原因。目前很多研究者都倾向于认为,风险投资过程中的信息不对称主要来自于高新技术的不确定性,认为信息缺口是因人们对某种专业知识的缺乏。而我们认为,在风险投资契约过程中,信息不对称的根源并不是自然技术的外生不确定性,而是人力资本的内生不确定性,具体表现为人力资本投入、产出、退出三个方面的不确定性。因此,风险投资的契约设计应基于人力资本的不确定性进行。从这一思路出发,本文尝试性地对风险投资实践中的分段投资、剩余索取权分配、剩余控制权安排等契约条款的成因做出了初步的理论解释。

Contract Design of Venture Capital Based on Uncertainty of Hmnan Capital

Asymmetric information is the key point of contract theory and the basic reason of contract design. It is commonly accepted that high-tech uncertainty causes asymmetric information in the venture capital investment, and lack of some specific knowledge leads to incomplete information. In fact, this asymmetric information doesn't come from outer-uncertainty of high-tech but inner-uncertainty of human capital, including uncertainty during input, output and withdrawn of human capital. Therefore, contract design of venture capital should be based on the uncertainty of human capital. In this paper, we are trying to give a theoretical explanation to the contractual arrangements of staged financing, surplus of property rights and control rights during the venture capital cycle.