| 论现代企业代理成本的控制 |
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| 引用本文： | 许清.论现代企业代理成本的控制[J].凯里学院学报,2006,24(2):25-27. |
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| 作者姓名： | 许清 |
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| 作者单位： | 华东师范大学商学院,中国,上海,200062 |
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| 摘 要： | 现代企业由于所有权和经营权的分离带来了代理关系,如何有效地控制企业的代理成本,一直是管理者们努力探索的主要问题。文章在阐述代理成本理论及形式的基础上,着重从企业的激励和约束机制分析入手,提出了相应的观点和建议,以期对企业的实际营运有所帮助。
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| 关 键 词： | 代理成本 股权 融资 激励与约束机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-6991(2006)02-0010-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年12月19 |
The Agency Cost Control for the Modern Enterprise |
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| Xu Qing.The Agency Cost Control for the Modern Enterprise[J].Journal of Southeast Guizhou National Teachers College,2006,24(2):25-27. |
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| Authors: | Xu Qing |
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| Abstract: | The separation of the ownership and management power in modern enterprises brings agency relationship, how to controls the agency cost in enterprises effectively, is always the main question which the manager explores diligently. This paper proposes the corresponding viewpoints and the suggestions, by emphatically analysis on the enterprise's incentive and the restraint mechanism, which bases on elaboration agency cost theory and its' forms, expecting to be useful to the actual operation of the enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | agency cost shareholding financing incentive and restraint mechanism |
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