| 上市公司资金闲置与再融资策略的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 田华.上市公司资金闲置与再融资策略的博弈分析[J].预测,2002,21(3):52-55,45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 田华 |
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| 作者单位： | 河海大学国际工商学院，江苏 南京 210098 |
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| 摘 要： | 我国上市公司资金大量闲置是非常普遍的现象，而这与其再融资策略的选择又是密切相关的。本文应用博弈论中的古诺模型和斯埋克尔伯格模型对这种现象进行分析，揭示了其中的内在原因。
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| 关 键 词： | 上市公司 资金闲置 再融资 博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5192(2002)03-0052-04 |
The Game Analysis on the Phenomenon of Idle Fund and the Behaviors of Fund Raising in our Securities Market |
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| TIAN Hua.The Game Analysis on the Phenomenon of Idle Fund and the Behaviors of Fund Raising in our Securities Market[J].Forecasting,2002,21(3):52-55,45. |
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| Authors: | TIAN Hua |
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| Abstract: | In our securities market, many corporations have much idle fund, but they are still eager for more money. In this paper, this phenomenon and the behaviors of the corporations have been discussed with a complete information static game model (Cournot game model) and a complete information dynamic game (Stackelberg game model). |
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| Keywords: | marketed corporations idle fund fund raising game theory |
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