| 经济交易中不完全契约的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张妮,沈创业.经济交易中不完全契约的博弈分析[J].技术与创新管理,2006,27(5):74-76,79. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张妮 沈创业 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学,陕西,西安,710049;交通银行西安分行,陕西,西安,710003 |
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| 摘 要： | 从契约的不完全性着手,运用违约租金的概念与博弈模型从交易特征、市场完善程度和企业规模等方面对履约过程进行了分析,指出不完全契约的履行主要依靠交易者的自我履约机制,该机制的作用机理是信誉贬值能够影响交易者的长期利益得失。
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| 关 键 词： | 契约 违约租金 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-7312（2006）05-0074-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-03-25 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-03-25 |
The Self-enforcing Mechanism of Incomplete Contract in Micro-economic Transaction |
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| ZHANG Ni,SHEN Chuang-ye.The Self-enforcing Mechanism of Incomplete Contract in Micro-economic Transaction[J].Technology and Innovation Management,2006,27(5):74-76,79. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Ni SHEN Chuang-ye |
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| Abstract: | This paper argues that all contracts can't be complete in real world.It demonstrates incomplete contract by combining fraud rent and game model to analyze the process of contract - enforcing.It's an easy conclusion that con- tract - enforcing can rely on the mechanism of self - enforcing which means that the disrepute will deeply affect the fraud's long benefit. |
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| Keywords: | contract fraud rent game |
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