基于信号传递博弈的能源行政执法补贴模型

由于罚没款必须全部上缴国库,而执法经费得不到良好的保障,导致能源行政执法(EALE)部门执法积极性低,使得行政处罚职能的发挥受到影响。实践中常用以提高执法积极性、保障经费支出的按比例返还罚没款方式、个案申请拨款等方法具有不可克服的缺点。寻找一种既合法、又能克服趋利性的激励机制与经费保障方式是当务之急。执法补贴是一种合法且合理的选择。本文以煤矿安监为例,运用信号传递博弈来分析这种方式的运行机理及EALE部门和财政部门的策略选择。结果表明,EALE补贴机制是否成功以及成功多少取决于申请执法补贴的EALE部门的伪装造假成本、被发现伪装造假的概率及财政部门认定其为执法型部门的先验信念。从政策角度,应对EALE补贴建立成文制度,且其关键在于防范EALE部门的伪装造假。

The subsidy policy model for energy administrative law enforcement based on the signaling game

Since fines must be all turned over to the state treasury and the operational funding of law enforcement is often unable to be well guaranteed. As a result, the department for Energy Administrative Law Enforcement (EALE) has low law enforcement zeal and also weakens the functions of administrative punishment. For the purpose raising law enforcement zeal and ensuring funding expenditure, the common practice returning fines pro rata and allocating money for individual case have some shortcomings which are unable to overcome. Looking for a legal and incentive mechanism that is able to overcome these shortcomings is the most pressing matter at the moment. Subsiding for law enforcement is a rational option. By taking the supervision on coal mines safety as an example, the operational mechanism of this method and strategy choice of EALE department and financial department are analyzed based on signaling game. It is found whether or not the subsidy mechanism is successful depends on the disguise cost of the EALE department, the probability that disguises are found, and the priori beliefs that the EALE department is identified as a law enforcement department by financial department. From a policy perspective, it should establish a written system for EALE subsidy. And the key of this system is to prevent the disguises from EALE department.