| 自主创新与模仿的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘和东,石岿然. 自主创新与模仿的博弈分析[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理, 2007, 28(4): 68-70 |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘和东 石岿然 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京工业大学,经济管理学院,江苏,南京,210009 |
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| 基金项目： | 江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金资助项目(06SJB630008) |
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| 摘 要： | 以罗默的领导——跟随者模型为基础,设计了创新者——模仿者博弈模型,推导出企业自主创新与模仿概率的决定因素,并对自主创新与模仿的决定进行了经济学分析,从而为企业或政府的创新政策提供参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 自主创新 模仿 博弈分析 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-0241（2007）04-0068-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-11-08 |
Game Analysis between the Independent Innovation and Follow |
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| LIU Hedong,SHI Kuiran. Game Analysis between the Independent Innovation and Follow[J]. Science of Science and Management of S.& T., 2007, 28(4): 68-70 |
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| Authors: | LIU Hedong SHI Kuiran |
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| Affiliation: | College of Management and Economics, Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing 210009, China |
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| Abstract: | From the game-theoretic perspective, this paper develops a innovation -follower model based on the Romer's leader-follower model, deducing the key factors of enterprise' independent innovation and follow rate, and gives economic analysis to the decision between independent innovation and follow, and so provides suggestion on policies in innovation to enterprises or governments concerned. |
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| Keywords: | independent innovation follow game analysis |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
