| 农民工子女教育政策执行的财政博弈与政策建议 |
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| 引用本文： | 李文彬.农民工子女教育政策执行的财政博弈与政策建议[J].广东教育学院学报,2009,29(6):48-54. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李文彬 |
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| 作者单位： | 华南理工大学,公共管理学院,广东,广州,510641 |
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| 摘 要： | 中央政府关于农民工子女义务教育政策的财政资金的供给机制是上级对下级财政的支配。但由于我国政府间财政处于竞争关系，这种支配受到下级政府不同程度的抵制。在当前的财政格局下，不执行或怠于执行农民工子女教育政策是各级财政博弈的“纳什均衡”。为提高该政策执行力，需要重建政策资金的供给机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 农民工子女教育政策 财政支配 财政竞争 财政博弈 |
The Implementation and Suggestions of Fiscal Game of Migrant Children Education Policy |
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| LI Wen-bin.The Implementation and Suggestions of Fiscal Game of Migrant Children Education Policy[J].Journal of Guangdong Education Institute,2009,29(6):48-54. |
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| Authors: | LI Wen-bin |
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| Institution: | LI Wen-bin(School of Public Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou,Guangdong,510641,P.R.China) |
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| Abstract: | The mechanism of fund supply of migrant children education policy is through financial domination from the higher government to the lower.But the domination was resisted by the lower government because of the competition in intergovernmental financial relationship.No execution or negative execution in migrant children education policy is the Nash equilibrium of intergovernmental financial gambling in the current fiscal pattern,which needs the rebuilding of the mechanism of fund supply to improve the policy ... |
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| Keywords: | migrant children education policy financial domination financial competition financial gambling |
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