"双高"现象、银企博弈与转型经济融资环境的影响

中国资本市场长期持续的双高现象,偏离了公司价值最大化的要求,其背后是在转型经济的融资环境影响下银企博弈的结果.银行在贷前以及贷后监督角色的欠缺,给了企业操纵借贷时间、传递误导信号的机会,以此扩大其当期融资能力并服务于跨期融资.当实际控制人具有掏空动机时,短期借款会明显超过正常经营的需要.在双高后期,为免各自利益受损,银企达成合谋,企业则出现了更为严重的借新还旧.

Why Cash Reserve and Short Term Leverage Simultaneously Overhang among Chinese Listed Companies?

This paper aims to analyze a peculiar phenomenon that 89 listed companies in China have both higher short term leverages and cash reserves consecutively for more than 2 years.Such financial pattern cannot be clearly explained by classical theories.In fact,it arises from dynamic gaming between bankers and real controllers of listed firms with their pursuits of individual interest maximization under the influence of the transition economy institutions in China.The analysis reveals that the firms disguise them...