Performance pay for teachers: Determinants and consequences |
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Authors: | Clive R. Belfield John S. Heywood |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Queens College, City University of New York, 65-30 Kissena Blvd., Flushing, NY 11367, USA;2. Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA |
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Abstract: | Theory and evidence on performance-related pay for teaching remain inconclusive. Teachers will respond to rewards, but an appropriate reward structure may not be devised because education is a collaborative endeavor. Here we test three hypotheses: performance-related pay among teachers is more likely to be observed when there are evident indicators of team production; teachers receiving performance pay will earn more in total than otherwise equal teachers without performance pay; and teachers receiving performance pay should have higher job satisfaction. We use the Schools and Staffing Survey (2000) to test each hypothesis. Team production does strongly predict performance-related pay, and that such pay does boost earnings, but that job satisfaction is lower for those who receive such pay awards. |
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Keywords: | Performance-related pay Teacher pay Productivity |
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