首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

国有商业银行基层行长激励--约束机制与绩效关系分析
引用本文:李民.国有商业银行基层行长激励--约束机制与绩效关系分析[J].广东技术师范学院学报,2002(2):51-55.
作者姓名:李民
作者单位:武汉大学,商学院,湖北,武汉,430072
摘    要:国有商业银行的基层行长是其所在行的核心,为了使其行为与总行这一初始委托人的目标相一致,必须对其进行激励--约束.当前的激励--约束机制是导致国有商业银行绩效表现不佳的原因之一.从经济学角度,改进激励措施的最主要改革方向是实行剩余分享制,为此,管理体制也应发生相应变革.

关 键 词:国有商业银行  基层行长  激励--约束机制  绩效
文章编号:1009-2803(2002)02-0051-05
修稿时间:2002年4月13日

An Analysis on the Relationship between the Managers Incentive and Restrictive Mechanism and Managers' Performance in State-owned Commercial Bank
Li Min.An Analysis on the Relationship between the Managers Incentive and Restrictive Mechanism and Managers'''' Performance in State-owned Commercial Bank[J].Journal of Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University,2002(2):51-55.
Authors:Li Min
Abstract:The senior manager is the core human capital in the state-owned commercial branch bank. It is essential to launch the senior managers' incentive and restrictive mechanism in order to induce them achieving the aim of the president. To sum up, the present managers' incentive and restrictive mechanism is one of the most important factors that results in the inefficiency of the state-owned commercial bank. It would be the essential measure to carry out the residual sharing scheme in order to satisfy the managers' basic requirement since they are the key roles in the operation and management of the state-owned commercial bank. Meanwhile, the supervisory system should be improved.
Keywords:state-owned commercial bank  manager  incentive and restrictive mechanism  performance
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号