公众参与对中央政府和地方政府间委托代理关系的影响

通过风险均摊定理(Arrow-Lind)得出了原属于风险规避型的地方政府,在公众参与的制度保证下,可以以风险中性的态度进行决策,这样根据信息经济学的理论中央政府就可以在信息不对称的条件下对地方政府的行为取向进行最优激励。得出了以下结论:公众参与不但能保证决策的科学性民主性,也能对中央政府与地方政府之间的委托代理关系的帕累托优化起到积极作用;在加强中央政府的人民代表行使权力加强监督的同时,需加强地方政府的人民代表的监督与公众参与程度。

Analysis of the Influence of Public Participation in the Principal- agent Model between Central Government and Local Government

Based on the Arrow-lind theory, the author concludes that local government who is risk aversion can be risk neutral on the condition of public participation, thus with the asymmetric information, the central government can still obtain pareto optimal incentive according to the information economics. This paper draws the following conclusion: firstly, public participation can not only make decisions more scientific and democratic,but also can be positive to the principal-agent relation between central government and local government; secondly, both the neutral and local system of people`s congress should be reinforced.