| 基于不完全执行污染排放管制的企业与政府博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 邓峰.基于不完全执行污染排放管制的企业与政府博弈分析[J].预测,2008,27(1):67-71. |
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| 作者姓名： | 邓峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 新疆大学,经济与管理学院,新疆,乌鲁木齐,830046 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部“春晖计划”资助项目(S2004-2-65030) |
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| 摘 要： | 企业经济活动所产生的污染是我国环境污染的主要来源,我国的环境政策大多局限于控制政策本身和实施政策所需的措施,并假设这些措施均能完全执行。而企业作为一个由利害关系基本一致的成员组成的群体,必然形成坚强的"利益刚性",其对政府的环境管制会采取各种规避措施。本文通过构建一个政府先行的博弈模型分析在管制不完全执行的情况下政府与企业之间的互动关系。
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| 关 键 词： | 不完全执行管制 规避 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5192（2008）01-0067-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-12-24 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年12月24 |
Game between the Government and Enterprise under Incompletely Implemented Regulations of Pollution |
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| DENG Feng.Game between the Government and Enterprise under Incompletely Implemented Regulations of Pollution[J].Forecasting,2008,27(1):67-71. |
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| Authors: | DENG Feng |
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| Abstract: | The pollution from economic activities of enterprise is the main source of environmental pollution in China,Chinese environmental policies mainly focus on the controlling regulations and the relative implementing measures,and these measures are supposed to be implemented completely.But as a set of members with coherent interest,the firms will generate strong rigidity of benefits,and will take many kinds of elusions to these regulations.In this paper,a game model with governmental precession is put forward to analyze the relationship between government and enterprises under incompletely implemented regulations of pollution. |
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| Keywords: | incompletely implemented regulation elusion game model |
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